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I say that if that proof [of the H-theorem] does not somewhere or other intro-
duce some assumptions about averages, probability, or irreversibility, it cannot
be valid. Culverwell (1894b)
So there is a general tendency for H to diminish, although it may conceivably
increase in particular cases. Just as in matters political, change for the better
is possible, but the tendency is for all change to be from bad to worse. Burbury
(1894a)
The first man to use a truly statistical approach was Boltzmann [in 1877]
and at that point kinetic theory changed into statistical mechanics even though
it was another twenty odd years before Gibbs coined the expression. ter Haar
(1955), pp. 296-7.
Abstract
A comparison is made of the traditional Loschmidt (reversibility) and
Zermelo (recurrence) objections to Boltzmann’s H-theorem, and its sim-
plified variant in the Ehrenfests’ 1912 wind-tree model. The little-cited
1896 (pre-recurrence) objection of Zermelo (similar to an 1889 argument
due to Poincare´) is also analysed. Significant differences between the
objections are highlighted, and several old and modern misconceptions
concerning both them and the H-theorem are clarified. We give partic-
ular emphasis to the radical nature of Poincare´’s and Zermelo’s attack,
and the importance of the shift in Boltzmann’s thinking in response to
the objections as a whole.
1
1 Introduction
Recent years have seen a growth of studies in the foundations of classical sta-
tistical mechanics, and its historical origins. Prominent amongst these studies
are the papers written by Jos Uffink dealing with inter alia the work of Ludwig
Boltzmann and his critics.1 Our aim in this paper is to supplement Uffink’s
magisterial treatment with some further observations on the nature of Boltz-
mann’s H-theorem and its discontents. We follow Paul and Tatiana Ehrenfest
in using their 1912 wind-tree model to bring out the logic and limitations of the
theorem. We are particularly interested in thee aspects of this story. One is the
nature and comparative strengths of the original objections. These include one
of Zermelo’s 1896 objections that is similar to Poincare´’s relatively little-known
1889 argument based on functional considerations which predated his recurrence
theorem. The second is the hard-line nature of the attack coming from both
Poincare´ and Zermelo, each of whose antipathy towards the the kinetic theory of
gases was based on considerations that went far beyond problems within the H-
theorem. The third—and one also emphasized in Uffink’s work— is the moment
of the introduction of probabilistic elements in the debate, at least on the part
of Boltzmann, where by probability we mean an appeal to considerations that
transcend assumptions about the actual, as opposed to expected, configuration
or evolution of a single gas.
The scheme of the paper is as follows. We start in sections 2 and 3 with
treatments of the original 1872 H-theorem for colliding molecules and the cor-
responding result in the 1912 wind-tree model. Section 4 contains a discussion
of the history of the initial response to the H-theorem, with particular emphasis
on the radical nature of the (remarkably similar) critiques of the kinetic theory
of gases due to Poincare´ and Zermelo. In section 5, the initial objections are
analyzed in more detail, and their relative strengths assessed. This is followed
in section 6 by a return to the history of our subject, and in particular to the fa-
mous debate amongst British commentators (as well as Boltzmann himself) that
occurred in the mid-1890s in Nature concerning the meaning of the H-theorem;
some critical remarks are made concerning Huw Price’s 1996 analysis of the
role of S. H. Burbury in the debate. In section 6, various misunderstandings in
the literature surrounding the critical assumption in the theorem, the famous
Stosszahlansatz, are cleared up. Then, in section 7, we return to Boltzmann
and his response to the reversibility objection, and highlight the change in his
interpretation of the H-theorem that marked some, but by no means all, of his
writings from 1877 on.
2 Boltzmann’s 1872 H-theorem
2.1 The theorem
The H-theorem was based on a model of a gas consisting of N hard, spherical
molecules of a single species, in a container with perfectly elastic walls.2 The
gas is sufficiently dilute that only binary collisions need be taken into account
1See Uffink (2004) and (2007).
2Boltzmann started his 1872 proof by stating that the particles were punctiform, but in
practice treated them as if they were hard spheres; see Boltzmann (1872).
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in the dynamics. Let the distribution (or density) function f(r,v, t) be defined
such that f(r,v, t)d3rd3v is the number of molecules within a volume element
d3r about r and with velocity lying within the velocity-space element d3v about
v.3 Boltzmann’s transport equation determines how f(r,v, t) evolves in time.
In deriving the transport equation, Boltzmann assumed that for the initial
state of the gas, the momentum distribution is isotropic: f0(r,v, t) = f0(r, v, t).
He also assumed that no external forces act on the gas and that at all times
the distribution is independent of position (homogeneous): f(r,v, t) = f(v, t).
(These conditions severely limit the possible initial states of the gas. In par-
ticular, the last condition means that the H-theorem does not apply in the
proverbial case where all the molecules of the gas are initially concentrated in
a corner of the container.4 For purposes that will later become clear, we note
that Boltzmann stresses that once spatial homogeneity is established, it must
persist forever in the absence of external disturbances.) It follows that the ex-
pression for ∂f/∂t depends only on collisions, so that the transport equation
can be expressed as a balance equation, in which losses are subtracted from gains
during collisions. But the crucial assumption that Boltzmann made (as Maxwell
did before him in 1867), later known as the Stosszahlansatz (‘assumption about
the number of collisions’, now sometimes abbreviated to SZA, a convention we
follow in this paper), is this.
Suppose we have two groups of molecules heading towards each other. Choose
one of the groups and call it the target group. Consider the collection S of all
the spatial volumes (cylinders) swept out by the target molecules in time ∆t
such that if any molecule of the second group is found in S there is bound to be
a collision. Note that S depends on the relative velocities of the molecules in
the two groups; it is not defined solely in relation to the target molecules! Then
suppose that the number of collisions that actually occur is the total volume
associated with S multiplied by the density of molecules of the second, colliding
group. This holds only if the spatial density of the colliding molecules in S is
the same as in any other part of space.
This is the way the Ehrenfests expressed the SZA in their famous 1912 review
article5, and a special case will be seen in the next section. However, at this
point some care needs to be taken to spell out the nature of the assumption.
The target region S is, to repeat, defined in relation to the relative velocities of
the molecules from the two groups, so since the distribution function f(r,v, t)
is already assumed to be position independent, the assumption depends on the
relationship between the momenta of the target and colliding molecules before
collision. Indeed, it is tantamount to the claim that the density F (v1, v2, t) of
pairs of molecules which are about to collide within the period [t, t +∆t] with
velocities v1 and v2 is given by the product of the single molecule densities:
F (v1, v2, t) = f(v1, t)f(v2, t), (1)
and thus the molecules entering into (but not out of!) collision are uncorrelated
3In fact, Boltzmann’s 1872 density function was defined relative to kinetic-energy space,
for which the H-function takes a slightly more complicated form than that given below.
4In his 1872 paper Boltzmann does discuss a possible generalization of the H-theorem
which allows for intitial spatial inhomogeneities, and is aware, as von Plato (1994) has noted,
that in this case the theorem will not be universally valid. However, as Uffink (2004, 2007)
has stressed, Boltzmann did not appear to think in 1872 that any exceptions could exist to
his original theorem; see section 7 below.
5Ehrenfest and Ehrenfest (1990), pp. 5, 6.
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in velocity. In 1872, Boltzmann did not indicate that the SZA was a hypoth-
esis, rather than an automatic property of the state of a gas; the condition is
introduced with neither justification nor name.6
Boltzmann further introduced the H-functional (denoted E in the 1872 pa-
per, but later widely called H , including by Boltzmann):
H [ft] =
∫
f(r,v, t) ln f(r,v, t)d3rd3v (2)
which is large for narrow distributions and small for wide ones. Since the number
of molecules in a gas is so large, Boltzmann treated the density function as
continuous and differentiable. Now given the transport equation, and assuming
SZA holds at time t0, it can be shown that
dH
dt
≤ 0. (3)
Boltzmann assumed that SZA holds at all times, thus ensuring the monotonic
behaviour of H over time. Equality in (3) holds when the gas reaches equi-
librium (the Maxwell-Boltzmann distribution, which is the unique stationary
distribution consistent with the assumptions). This is Boltzmann’s H-theorem,
one of whose assumptions we take to be the validity of SZA at all times.7 The
theorem gives a mechanical underpinning to both the spontaneous, monotonic
approach to equilibrium8 and its associated entropy increase, H playing the
role of the negative of the entropy (‘negentropy’). It is important to recognize
that, unlike in phenomenological thermodynamics, negentropy is now defined
for non-equilibrium configurations of the system, as well as for the equilibrium
state.
As is well known, important limitations associated with the H-theorem were
brought to light in the early “reversibility” and “recurrence” objections. But
6See in this connection Ehrenfest and Ehrenfest (1990), p. 84, footnote 49 and Uffink
(2007), section 4.2.3. Within the literature on the kinetic theory of gases, the SZA is sometimes
taken to hold for arbitrary pairs of molecules, not just those entering into collisions. See, for
example, Jeans (1925), p. 17. In the present paper we shall restrict it to pairs of colliding
molecules; the importance of doing so will be seen in section 7 below.
7Recent treatments of the H-theorem are found in Emch and Liu (2002) and Zeh
(2001). Zeh’s discussion of the SZA is slightly confusing. He says ”Boltzmann proposed
his Stosszahlansatz (collision equation)” (p. 42) and interprets this to be the transport equa-
tion mentioned above. But Boltzmann did not use the term Stosszahlansatz ; it was introduced
by the Ehrenfests in 1912 and for a quite distinct assumption, as we have seen. The signifi-
cance of this no-correlations assumption is not highlighted either in Zeh’s treatment, or in the
recent, brief account of the H-theorem found in Albert (2000). Albert regards Boltzmann’s
homogeneity condition mentioned above, viz. that the distribution function f does not de-
pend on position, as “a bit less innocent, a bit less obviously true” (p. 55) than another
of Boltzmann’s assumptions, namely that the collision cross section for pairs of molecules is
rotationally symmetric. But recall that Boltzmann was at first only interested in deriving
equilibration only with respect to the velocity (actually, kinetic energy), not spatial, distri-
bution, and in the process deriving the Maxwell-Boltzmann distribution. As for the reason
that Boltzmann managed to get a time-asymmetric result, in so far as Albert gives one, it
appears to be that low values of H correspond to states with “by far the largest number
of microdestinations” (footnote 17, p. 55). But such combinatorial considerations are quite
foreign to the spirit of the H-theorem, and were only entertained by Boltzmann in 1877, as
we shall see.
8The claim in classical thermodynamics that an isolated system found outside of equilib-
rium will spontaneously and irreversibly approach a unique equilibrium state is not to be
confused with the second law; the disanalogies between the H-theorem and the second law
were clarified in Uffink (2004, 2007).
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Uffink has recently stressed9 that a challenge raised by O. E. Lanford in the
1970s is “of no less importance” than these famous objections, and it concerns
the very consistency of the Boltzmann equation lying at the heart of the the-
orem. The problem is to demonstrate the (at least approximate) equivalence
of two predictive processes. In the first, the microstate of the gas at some ini-
tial time is allowed to evolve by way of Hamiltonian dynamics for a specified
interval, and the distribution function inferred from the final microstate. In
the second, the Boltzmann equation is solved for the distribution function as-
sociated with the initial microstate, to determine the distribution function at
the end of the specified interval.10 Uffink has argued that the solution to this
problem offered by Lanford and others sheds important light on the meaning
of the H-theorem and the role of the SZA. However, in the present paper, we
restrict ourselves largely to the original objections, and the attempt Boltzmann
made to deal with them. And before we proceed, we need to look at one final
aspect of Boltzmann’s 1872 reasoning.
2.2 The role of probability in the theorem, or lack thereof
As we noted above, Boltzmann justified the well-behavedness of the density
function f by appealing to the large number of molecules in question. But
starting with the 1899 work of Burbury11, it has been recognized that because
the number of molecules is strictly finite, f can only be a well-defined contin-
uous function in the context of a probabilistic reading of it. For instance, in
his 1916 treatise on the kinetic theory of gases, Sir J. H. Jeans insisted that
f(r,v, t)d3rd3v is the expected number of molecules selected at random within
a volume element d3r about r and with velocities lying within the momentum-
space element d3v about p. Jeans wrote that “no exception can be taken either
to its intelligibility or truth” in regard to this statement, precisely because of
the introduction of the probabilistic notion of “expectation”.12
This stance may have much to recommend it in terms of rigour, but it is
far from clear that it was Boltzmann’s. Despite the fact that he used the word
“probability” in relation to the density function f , it seems that such a notion
was far more innocent in Boltzmann’s 1872 reasoning than in Jeans’s. When,
some years later, Boltzmann was forced to soften his H-theorem as the result of
serious objections to it (to be rehearsed below), he would in his defense refer to
the fact that he had used the term probability in his 1872 paper. But the shift in
Boltzmann’s post-1872 thinking, one of the central themes of the present paper,
reflects what in our view (following that of Uffink13) is the fact that he did not
have in mind the notion of expectation, but rather what he saw as justifiable
approximation to idealized counting, in his treatment of 1872.14
9Uffink (2007), section 6.4.
10The appropriateness of the regarding the Boltzmann equation as deterministic was also
questioned by Kuhn (1978), p. 45.
11Burbury (1899).
12See Jeans (1954), sections 11 - 14. Further support for this line of thinking is found in
Eggarter (1973) footnote 5 (see further references therein), and Zeh (2001), pp. 41-2, 45-6. A
separate, dynamical argument in favour of interpreting the density function as probabilistic
in nature is due to Kuhn (1978), and will be discussed in section 8.1 below.
13See Uffink (2007), section 4.2.
14It seems, as Uffink notes (2007), section 3.2.1, that Maxwell had previously had essentially
the same interpretation of the velocity distribution function.
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We want to bring out this key conceptual point by way of the study of a
simple mechanical model. Several such models exist which expose and clarify the
the core elements of the 1872 H-theorem: the 1907 dog-flea and 1912 wind-tree
models of the Ehrenfests, and the 1959 Kac ring model. We shall briefly review
the wind-tree model, partly because it may be less well known to philosophers.15
And we shall provide a new proof of the monotonic behaviour of the analogue
H functional, in which the density function has a well-defined non-probabilistic
meaning, and is not assumed to be differentiable with respect to time.
3 The wind-tree model
Imagine a set of N identical point particles (the wind), called “P -molecules”, in
motion in a 2-dimensional plane extending indefinitely in space. These molecules
are non-interacting and interpenetrable and are constrained to move at the same
speed v in the four perpendicular directions:
(1) → ; (2) ↑ ; (3) ← ; (4) ↓
Imagine also a set of identical, immobile “Q-molecules” (the trees) of finite
size and square shape, with a random but uniform distribution in the plane,
and off of which the P -molecules scatter. Each side of each Q-molecule makes
an angle of 45 degrees with two of the four directions above, so as to preserve
the above constraint on the directions of motion.16 The average distance be-
tween the Q-molecules is large in comparison to the length of the side of these
molecules.
Suppose now that collisions between the P - and Q-molecules are elastic
in respect of the former. The Q-molecules are unaffected by the collisions, and
therefore so is the above directional constraint on the motion of the P -molecules.
The dynamics of the collisions for the P -molecules is given as follows.
Let fi(t) denote the number of P -molecules moving in the i-th direction (i
= (1), (2), (3), (4)) at time t; this velocity distribution will be time-dependent.
Let furthermore N12(∆t) denote the number of P -molecules whose motion goes,
as a result of collision, from (1) to (2) (i.e. → to ↑) in the temporal interval
between t0 and t0 + ∆t. (This term should have the time t0 as an index, but
shortly we will be making claims that hold for all t.) Then such molecules at
t0 must be found within strips S (in the form of parallelograms) of length v∆t
attached to the appropriate sides of the Q-molecules.
We now make the Collision Assumption (the analogue of Botzmann’s SZA)
for the time t0:
The fraction of about-to-collide P -molecules lying in strips S of a given type
equals the ratio of the total area of strips of that type to the total free area of
the plane.
15Recent treatments of the dog-flea model are found in Ambegaokar and Clerk (1999) and
Emch and Liu (2002); the Kac ring model is discussed in detail in Schulman (1997), chapter 2,
and Bricmont (1995). The wind-tree model first appeared in 1912; see Ehrenfest and Ehrenfest
(1990). The expression ”wind-tree” is not found in the Ehrenfests’ text, but Paul Ehrenfest
used it in his lectures, and it has become common in the literature. A generalization of the
model involving rotated and rotating trees is found in van Holtent and van Sarloos (1980).
16The wind-tree model is a special case of the so-called Lorentz model, where non-interacting
particles move through a random array of stationary scatterers.
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Specifically, N12(∆t) = k∆tf1(t0), where k is a factor that depends on ...
and k∆t denotes the area ratio just mentioned, which itself will not depend on
the type of strip. Thus we get the balance equation
f1(t0 +∆t) = f1 −N12(∆t) +N21(∆t) +N41(∆t)−N14(∆t) (4)
= f1 + k∆t(f2 + f4 − 2f1), (5)
where all the fs on the right hand sides are defined at time t0. Analogous
equations hold of course for the remaining fi(t0 +∆t).
The Ehrenfests argued that one can infer by inspection of these equations
that a monotonic decrease in the the differences between the fi must ensue. But
this is not correct; it is not hard to find counterexamples.17 It does however
follow from the Collision Assumption that if we define
H ≡
4∑
i=1
fi ln fi (6)
then H(t0 + ∆t) ≤ H(t0). A proof is found in Appendix A below, one which
does not assume that H is differentiable with respect to t (see the remarks at
the end of the last section).
If it is now assumed that the Collision Assumption holds for all t0 + n∆t,
n = 1, 2, . . ., then it follows from this result that H decreases monotonically
until it reaches its minimal value18 of N(lnN − ln 4), which corresponds to the
equilibrium (“Maxwell-Boltzmann”) distribution
f¯1 = f¯2 = f¯3 = f¯4 = N/4. (7)
4 A little history
4.1 Background
It took several years after 1872, the year of his H-theorem, before Boltzmann
was forced to admit that the treatment could not be entirely correct in its
original form.
In 1874 James Clerk Maxwell, J. J. Thomson and P. G. T. Tait were aware
that the result was hard to reconcile with the time reversal invariance of the
dynamics of a gas. Josef Loschmidt, a friend and mentor to Boltzmann since the
latter’s student days19 (and actually the first to calculate Avogadro’s number)
alluded to this problem in a paper published in 187620, and the problem is now
standardly referred to as the Loschmidt, or reversibility objection (Umkehrein-
wand). The problem was independently raised in 1894 by E. P. Culverwell,
17What does follow from the equations is that |f1− f3|, |f2− f4|, and |(f1+ f3)− (f1+ f2)|
decay monotonically to zero, but they are compatible with, say, an intitial, temporary increase
in |f1 − f2|.
18As Jos Uffink pointed out to us (private communication), there is nothing in this reasoning,
nor indeed in the original H-theorem, that strictly ensures that the gas will eventually reach
its minimal value of H even if the Collision assumption, or SZA, holds at all times. But along
with Boltzmann, we shall assume that the equilibrium state of the gas is the state of minimal
H.
19See the recent review of Boltzmann’s life in Reiter (2007).
20Loschmidt (1876).
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who in a note to Nature, queried a treatment of the H-theorem due to H. W.
Watson.21 This note, which ended with the famous query “Will some one say
exactly what the H theorem proves?”, led to a series of comments in Nature
in the following years from Watson, Joseph Larmor, G. H. Bryan, and most
importantly Samuel H. Burbury and Boltzmann himself. Arguably the most
significant aspect of this debate was the clarification by Burbury of the role of a
time-asymmetric assumption in the theorem, though, as we shall see in section 6
below, the connection between this assumption and the SZA was never properly
clarified by Burbury.
Although the other participants of the Nature debate were unaware of it,
Boltzmann had already given the first version of his reply to the reversibility
objection in 1877, in which he introduced probabilistic considerations hitherto
absent in the story. We will return in section 8 to this important turn of events,
but note in the meantime first that the 1877 papers seem to have been widely
ignored for the next two decades, and second that Boltzmann’s probabilistic
turn was largely beside the Loschmidt point.
In 1889 Henri Poincare´ published a paper attempting to show that no mono-
tonically increasing (entropy) function could be defined in terms of the canon-
ical variables in a theory of the N -body system subject to Hamiltionian dy-
namics.22 The paper precedes Poincare´’s famous publication in 1890 of the
recurrence theorem for isolated finite dynamical systems23. The 1889 paper
was designed to cast doubt on the proposal that Helmholtz had raised in 1882
for modeling apparently irreversible processes by appeal to dynamical systems
with hidden, or cyclic variables, along with the separation of slow- and rela-
tively fast-changing properties of the system.24 A related argument is found in
Poincare´’s 1889 lectures on thermodynamics, published in 1892 under the title
Thermodynamique25 .
In 1893, Poincare´ used his 1890 recurrence theorem in a second critique of
the purported mechanical underpinning of thermodynamic behaviour, in a paper
apparently written for philosophers26. Now the focus was not just Helmholtz’s
work but also the kinetic theory of gases, which according to Poincare´ had
adopted the “English” approach to explaining irreversible behaviour on the
basis of probabilistic considerations.27
But it was the more detailed 1896 argument28 by the young Ernst Zermelo
(who would later achieve further fame through his work on the foundations of
set theory) that drew Boltzmann’s attention to the recurrence theorem. Zermelo
21Culverwell (1894a).
22Poincare´ (1889).
23Poincare´ (1890).
24A useful treatment of this development, and its influence on Boltzmann, is found in Klein
(1973).
25Poincare´ (1892a).
26Poincare´ (1893).
27Famously, in a 1870 letter to Strutt, Maxwell wrote: “The second law of thermodynamics
has the same degree of truth as the statement that if you throw a tumblerful of water into
the sea, you cannot get the same tumblerful of water out again.” (For further details, see
Klein (1973), footnote 14.) In his 1899 lectures and in his 1893 paper, Poincare´ used a similar
analogy in describing the “English” hypothesis: “ ... if one had a hectolitre of wheat and
a grain of barley, it would be easy to hide this grain in the middle of the wheat; but it
would be almost impossible to find it again, so that the phenomenon appears to be in a sense
irreversible.” Poincare´ (1893).
28Zermelo (1896a).
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seems at the time to have been unaware of Poincare´’s 1893 paper; at any rate
the objection to the H-theorem based on this theorem is now widely known as
the Zermelo, or recurrence objection (Wiederkehreinwand). Thus the standard
terminology privileges Zermelo over Poincare´, and indeed at first sight it might
seem that Poincare´’s and Zermelo’s aims and conclusions were significantly dif-
ferent. Let’s delve into this matter in a bit more detail.
4.2 The Poincare´ and Zermelo critiques
In his 1889 paper related to the Helmholtz program, Poincare´ had written:
Do irreversible phenomena lend themselves in the same man-
ner to a purely mechanical explanation? Can one, for example, in
representing the world as made up of atoms and these atoms as un-
dergoing attractions depending only on distances, explain why heat
can never pass from a cold body to a hot body? I do not believe so,
and I am going to explain why the theory of the renowned physicist
[Helmholtz] does not seem to me to apply to apply to phenomena of
this kind.29
Three years later, Poincare´ was to reply to P. G. Tait’s rather scathing 1892
review of his book Thermodynamique, published in Nature. Tait had berated
Poincare´ for, amongst other things, failing to address the statistical nature of
the second law of thermodynamics.30 Poincare´ replied:
I have completely left aside a mechanical explanation of the prin-
ciple of Clausius which M. Tait calls “the true (i.e. the statistical)
basis of the second Law of Thermodynamics.”
I have not spoken of this explanation, which by the way seems to
me hardly satisfactory, because I wanted to stay completely outside
of all molecular hypotheses however ingenious they might be; and in
particular I passed over the kinetic theory of gases in silence.31
Now Poincare´’s 1893 paper, which, to repeat, discusses the implications of
his 1890 recurrence theorem for the kinetic theory of gases, ominously starts
by referring to the “mechanistic conception of the universe which has seduced
so many good men”. The point of the paper is actually somewhat ambigu-
ous. Poincare´ raises the “contradiction” between the predicted recurrence phe-
nomenon and the expectation, based on experience, that the universe is heading
inexorably towards a state of heat death. And he wonders whether anyone has
noted that the English kinetic theories, which for him represent the most se-
rious attempt to reconcile mechanism and experience, can actually “extricate
29Poincare´ (1889).
30Tait (1892).
31‘J’ai laisse´ comple´tement de coˆte´ une explication me´canique du principe de Clausius que
M. Tait appelle “the true (i.e. the statistical) basis of the second Law of Thermodynamics.”
Je n’ai pas parle´ de cette explication, qui me paraˆıt d’ailleurs assez peu satisfaisante, parce
que je de´sirais rester comple`tement en dehours de toutes les hypothe`ses mole´culaires quelque
inge´nieuses qu’elles puissent eˆtre; et en particuliere j’ai passe´ sous silence la the´orie cine´tique
des gaz.’ Poincare´ (1892b). Curiously, Poincare´’s last remark is not strictly true; he did
mention the kinetic theory in the final section of Thermodynamique, and here admits that
through its probabilistic, or “statistical” reading of the laws of thermodynamics, it is the only
mechanical approach that “has any chance of success”. Poincare´ (1892a), section 333, p. 450.
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themselves from this contradiction”. What follows in the paper appears to be
Poincare´’s suggestion as to how this extrication comes about, and it brings no
surprises. The kinetic theory of gases may in principle be capable of accounting
for the universe’s initial approach to equilibrium, but Poincare´ argues that the
theory must predict that the universe will, “after millions of millions of cen-
turies” awaken from this “sort of slumber” and start to move away from the
state of heat death.
According to this theory, to see heat pass from a cold body to
a warm one, it will not be necessary to have the acute vision, the
intelligence, and the dexterity of Maxwell’s demon; it will suffice to
have a little patience.
One would like to be able to stop at this point and hope that
some day the telescope will show us a world in the process of waking
up, where the laws of thermodynamics are reversed.
It is hard not to wonder whether there is a hint of irony here on Poincare´’s
part. At any rate, in the final part of his 1893 paper, he mentions “other con-
tradictions” in the kinetic theories; although he does not specify what they are,
he expresses doubts even as to the very consistency of the theories, in so far
as they contain “reversibility in the premises and irreversibility in the conclu-
sion”.32 His final paragraph, however, tellingly (and somewhat confusingly)
returns to experiment:
Thus the difficulties that concern us [with the kinetic theories] have
not been overcome, and it is possible that they never will be. This
would amount to a definite condemnation of mechanism, if the ex-
perimental laws should prove to be distinctly different from the the-
oretical ones.
A final revelation of Poincare´s views is found in his 1898 article (an English
translation of which was published in Nature in the same year) on the stability
of the solar system. Here, Poincare´ stresses that the components of the solar
system are not “fictitious” material points beloved of the mathematicians but
extended, inelastic bodies wherein tidal forces (even in the case of wholly solid
bodies) produce heat which is dissipated into space. In the long run, the solar
system will consequently reach a final state from which it will not deviate.33
Significantly, Poincare considers the production of heat, and the irreversible
nature of entropy increase, to amount to a force acting on the system that is
“complementary” to the Newtonian force of gravity. One of the main points of
his 1898 paper was to convince the reader by way of an illuminating discussion
of this complementary force that not even the movements of the heavenly bodies
are exempt from that instability which is “the law of all natural phenomena”.
(Stability is being defined here as the property of the system not to deviate
significantly over arbitrary time from its original orbit.)
What all of these papers from 1889 to 1898 show is a clear antipathy on
Poincare´’s part to the attempt to apply mechanical principles to an under-
32It is curious that earlier in the paper, Poincare´ asserts, without justification, that “re-
versibility is a necessary consequence of all mechanistic hypotheses.”
33In the absence of friction due to some medium permeating space, this final state will be
such that “the sun, all the planets and their satellites, would move with the same velocity
around the same axis, as if they were parts of one solid invariable body.” Poincare (1898).
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standing of thermodynamical processes, including the probabilistic reasoning in
the kinetic theory of gases that he attributes to Maxwell. What about Zermelo?
His first 1896 paper might might easily be read to have a different tone from
Poincare´’s 1893 paper. Zermelo refers to the arguments by Boltzmann and
Lorentz that the Maxwell-Boltzmann velocity distribution for a gas is reached
as a stationary final state; he argues that on the basis of Poincare´’s recurrence
theorem “there can be no single-valued continuous function . . . of the [micro-
]states that always increases for all initial states in some region [of the phase
space], no matter how small the region”.34 Under a generous construal, Zermelo
might be seen to be questioning not so much the program of providing a me-
chanical underpinning of thermodynamics per se, as the current form of proofs
therein of the irreversible behaviour associated with spontaneous equilibration.
He insists on the “necessity of making a fundamental modification either in the
Carnot-Clausius principle or the mechanical viewpoint.” His critique is directed
to the ideas of the pre-1877 Boltzmann, i.e. the attempt ”to prove that the
well-known velocity distribution will be reached as a stationary final state, as
its discoverers Maxwell and Boltzmann wished to do”.35 Poincare´, on the other
hand, is looking in his 1893 paper beyond this development, or rather back to
the probabilistic ideas of Maxwell (and Tait, J, Willard Gibbs and others).
But there are hints in the Zermelo paper of a harder line, and a reading
of his subsequent reply to Boltzmann’s response to his 1896 paper displays his
(Zermelo’s) real feelings. They are, after all, close to Poincare´’s. Zermelo, after
admitting that in fact he “was not familiar with Herr Boltzmann’s investigations
of gas theory” in 1893 (by which he presumably means Boltzmann’s post-1872
writings), states his position quite clearly:
As for me (and I am not alone in this opinion), I believe that
a single principle [the second law] summarizing an abundance if es-
tablished experimental facts is more reliable than a mathematical
theorem [Poincare´’s recurrence theorem], which by its nature rep-
resents only a theory which can never be directly verified; I prefer
to give up the theorem rather than the principle, if the two are
inconsistent.36
Now of course Boltzmann, after his probabilistic turn in 1877, and in particular
in his 1896 reply to Zermelo37, was arguing that the theorem and the principle,
suitably interpreted, are not in conflict. But Zermelo correctly complained
that Boltzmann’s assertion that the Maxwell-Boltzmann distribution is not the
truly stationary final state of a gas “does not follow sufficiently clearly from
his earlier writings”, and, more to the point, that it does not form the basis
of an analogue of the second law of thermodynamics. Zermelo cogently argued
that if the probability of H decreasing from a given non-equilibrium state is
34Zermelo (1896a). p. 212.
35Zermelo is of course doing an injustice to Maxwell, and the post-1877 Boltzmann. He
refers in his paper to the above-mentioned debate in Nature on the H-theorem, but obviously
failed to read Boltzmann’s contributions, as he effectively admitted in his second 1896 paper;
see below.
36Zermelo (1896b). Max Planck, under whom Zermelo had studied, accepted no deviations
whatever to the second law of thermodynamics. (We are grateful to Jos Uffink for this
information.) In mentioning that he was not alone in his position, could Zermelo have been
thinking of Planck?
37Boltzmann (1896).
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defined by way of the Schuetz-Boltzmann fluctuating H curve (see section 8
below), then the fact that there are as many points on the curve corresponding
to that non-equilibrium state which lead to increasing H as those leading to
a decreasing H is ruinous to the program. As Uffink noted in his detailed
analysis of the debate between Zermelo and Boltzmann38, Zermelo anticipated
the now widely appreciated point that in order to make sense of Boltzmann’s
probabilistic picture, at least as it stood in 1896, one has to introduce an extra
assumption—what is often referred to today as the past hypothesis— to the effect
that at the beginning of time the value ofH for the universe was high.39 Zermelo
argued furthermore that “... as long as one cannot make comprehensible the
physical origin of the initial state, one must merely assume what one wants to
prove; instead of an explanation one has a renunciation of any explanation.”40
He concluded his astute critique of Boltzmann’s reasoning as follows:
I have therefore not been able to convince myself that Herr Boltz-
mann’s probability arguments, on which [quoting Boltzmann (1896)]
“the clear comprehension of the gas-theoretic theorem” is supposed
to rest, are in fact able to dispel the doubts of a mechanical expla-
nation of irreversible processes based on Poincare´’s theorem, even if
one renounces the strict irreversibility in favour of a merely empiri-
cal one. Indeed it is clear a priori that the probability concept has
nothing to do with time and therefore cannot be used to deduce any
conclusions about the direction of irreversible processes.41
Of course the story does not stop there. In 1897, Boltzmann was to reply
to Zermelo, and introduce the remarkable suggestion that the above-mentioned
past hypothesis can be avoided if the direction of time for living beings is defined
by entropic increase, so opposite slopes of peaks in the fluctuating H-curve for
the universe can have time pointing in opposite directions!42 But this develop-
ment takes us too far afield. Let us look in more detail at the early objections
to the H-theorem.
38This probing analysis goes considerably beyond the issues we are raising here; see Uffink
(2007). If there is anything in Uffink’s analysis that we might quibble with, however, it is
his claim that “... Boltzmann misrepresented Zermelo’s argument as concluding that the
mechanical view should be given up. As we have seen, Zermelo only argued for a dilemma
between the strict validity of the kinetic theory and the strict validity of thermodynamics.
Empirical matters were not relevant to Zermelos analysis.” (section 4.5.6) This reading of
Zermelo’s position is hard to reconcile with the quote we gave above from Zermelo (1896b), in
conjunction with his inability to see how Boltzmann accounted for the thermodynamic arrow
of time in any satisfactory way.
39See, for example, Amegaokar and Clerk (1999) and Albert (2000).
40Zermelo (1896b). It is not clear this objection would have bothered Boltzmann, who in
his initial reply to Zermelo wrote: ”An answer to the question—how does it happen that at
present the bodies surrounding us are in a very improbable state—cannot be given, any more
than one can expect science to tell us why phenomena occur at all and take place according
to certain laws.” Boltzmann (1896).
41Zermelo might be said to have partially anticipated the arguments found in Uffink (2007),
sections 7.6 and 7.7, and Bacciagaluppi (2007), to the effect that the introduction of stochastic
dynamical principles into statistical mechanics does not serve to pick out a privileged arrow
of time.
42Boltzmann (1897).
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5 The nature of the objections
5.1 The Loschmidt-Culverwell reversibility objection
In the context of the wind-tree model, imagine a second model, identical to
the first above, but in which at time t0 all the P -molecules have the the same
positions but opposite velocities, so that
f ′1 = f3; f
′
2 = f4; f
′
3 = f1; f
′
4 = f2. (8)
It is obvious that H ′ = H at t0.
But the collision dynamics are time-reversal invariant, which means that
if we played a film of the collisions in the original model backwards, the be-
haviour of the P -molecules in the film would be consistent with the rules of the
model. Thus for every sequence of states of the ‘gas’, the inverse sequence is
also possible—including one with negentropy H at time t0.
Specifically, suppose the initial state s0 of the system at t0 corresponds to all
the P -molecules moving in direction (1). When an arbitrary time T has elapsed,
a new state sT will have been achieved. Now consider preparing another initial
state s′0 at t0 such that distribution of P -molecules corresponds to that of sT but
with all the directions of motion reversed. After time T in this new arrangement,
the system arrives at a state s′T in which all the P -molecules are in state (3)
(the reverse of (1)). But consider finally the situation at a time slightly before
that, viz. t0 + T −∆t, which shall be denoted by T−. Then we must have that
of the possible Nij(∆t), those where j = 1, 2, 4 must vanish, and it is easy to
show that this is inconsistent with Nij(∆t) = Nik(∆t) = kfi(T−) as required
by the Collision Assumption.43
5.2 Zermelo’s 1896 pre-recurrence objection
We mentioned above Poincare’s 1889 critique of Helmboltz’s treatment of irre-
versibility by way of cyclic variables. Poincare´ imagines a single-valued func-
tion S of the generalized coordinates and momenta of a Hamiltonian system
representing the entropy of the system44, and shows that S cannot be a non-
decreasing function along orbits. What was the lesson to be drawn according
to Poincare´?
We must then conclude that the two principles of increase of entropy
and of least action (understood in the sense of Hamilton) are irrec-
oncilable. . . . it seems probable that it will be necessary to search
elsewhere [i.e. outside of Lagrangian dynamics] for the explanation
of irreversible phenomena and to abandon in this case the familiar
hypotheses of rational mechanics from which one derives the equa-
tions of Lagrange and Hamilton.
Although Poincare´’s analysis is not strictly applicable to the H-theorem, the
quotation indicates the general aversion he had to a mechanical treatment of
irreversibility.
43See Rechtman et al. (1991).
44As Olsen (1993) points out in his footnote 2, Poincare´ (like Boltzmann) goes beyond ther-
modynamics in assuming that such an entropy function is meaningful outside of equilibrium.
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It is also noteworthy that Poincare´ does not appeal to Liouville’s theo-
rem. Now in his first 1896 paper, Zermelo independently provided an argu-
ment against the H-theorem that uses the Liouville theorem but otherwise is
similar in spirit to Poincare´’s 1889 argument, and makes no appeal to the full
recurrence result. In order to put Zermelo’s argument—which we feel deserves
attention45—in modern language, we need to take a brief diversion through
some familiar details.
5.2.1 The phase space with measure-preserving flow
Suppose we have a gas consisting ofN particles. Consider the space whose points
represent possible (micro-) states of the gas, specified jointly by the configuration
variables q1, q2, . . . , qN and momentum variables p1, p2, . . . , pN . We denote this
2N -dimensional space by Γ, and the state of the gas at time t by the vector
(q(t),p(t)) ∈ Γ. Given the Hamiltonian equations of motion for the positions
and momenta of the N molecules, the Liouville theorem establishes that the
volume in the phase space Γ, as defined by the standard Lebesgue measure, is
preserved. Any (measurable) subset of Γ evolves under Hamiltonian flow like
an incompressible fluid.
Now if the system is isolated, not all the phase space Γ is available to it,
since the motion is constrained by the conservation of energy. The phase point
is confined to the hypersurface ΓE defined by H(q,p) = E, H being the Hamil-
tonian of the gas. Taking a set A which lies on the surface, its time-development
is also on the surface. But in this case what is preserved is the measure
µ(A) =
∫
A
dσ
‖∇H‖ (9)
where dσ is the element of surface area on the energy surface induced by the
Lebesque measure, and ‖∇H‖ is the Euclidean vector norm of the gradient of
H .46 What is important for our purposes is not the form of the measure, but
that such a time-preserved measure exists.
So let us consider a dynamical system defined by the quadruple 〈Γ,A, µ, Tt〉,
where Γ is the state space of the system, A a σ-algebra of measurable subsets
of Γ, µ a measure on the measure space 〈Γ,A〉, and Tt a one-parameter family
of mappings Tt : Γ→ Γ that preserve the measure µ.
A measure-preserving flow is one which leaves the measure µ invariant in
the following sense: for all A ∈ A and for all t
µ (Tt(A)) = µ (A) (10)
where Tt(A) is the time-development of the set A, in the sense that TtA = {Ttx :
x ∈ A}.
It is further assumed that T0 = I (the identity) and that the semi-group
property TsTt = Ts+t, for s, t ≥ 0, holds. Normally it is assumed that (as in
Hamiltonian dynamics) Tt is invertible, which means that the transformation is
one-one, or bijective.
45Olsen (1993) gives a systematic treatment of a related result due to Misra and Prigogine
from c. 1980, but seems to have overlooked Zermelo’s argument.
46See Khinchin (1949), Chapter II, section 7.
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The specific case of a gas with invertible Hamiltonian flow is reversible if for
any (q0,p0) and (q1,p1) ∈ Γ
(q1,p1) = Tτ (q0,p0) ⇐⇒ Tτ (q1,−p1) = (q0,−p0) (11)
More generally, the reversibility condition (which is stronger than that of in-
vertibility) is equivalent to the claim that the fundamental equations of motion
are covariant (form invariant) under time reversal. This is the condition needed
in the original Loschmidt-Culverwell objection to the H-theorem.
5.2.2 The Zermelo measure-theoretic argument
We are now in a position to reformulate the Zermelo argument in relation to
a dynamical system 〈Γ,A, µ, Tt〉, with the measure µ preserved by the flow Tt.
Let us suppose that S is indeed a non-negative entropy function on phase space,
which is non-decreasing on orbits. Note that a crucial assumption is that the
measure of the phase space Γ is finite: µ (Γ) < ∞. Consider a measurable set
of states g ∈ A, and its entire future development G represented by
G =
⋃
n
Tnτ (g), (12)
for some arbitrary finite τ . Note that µ(G) <∞. It follows if S is an integrable
function that the integral ∫
Tt(G)
Sdµ (13)
is non-decreasing with the increase of time. But this is inconsistent with the
fact that Tt(G) is contained in G, together with the assumption that µ(Tt(G)) =
µ(G), unless S is constant along trajectories almost everywhere.
Note that it is not assumed that Tt is reversible, or even invertible. Variations
of the proof are found in Appendix B below.
5.3 The Poincare´-Zermelo recurrence objection
Poincare´’s 1890 recurrence theorem is widely regarded as establishing that any
conservative, finite mechanical system with energy bounded from above is quasi-
periodic (though some care is needed in stating its implications accurately as
we shall see). Thus, speaking loosely, if there is a sequence of states of the
system involving decreasing negentropy, then if left to itself long enough (and
for typical systems in statistical mechanics “long” means greater than the age
of the universe) the system will ordinarily and eventually run through a series
of states that are abritrarily close to the original series, with arbitrarily close
values ofH . Apparently then, mechanical principles not only allow for behaviour
that involves motion away from equilibrium, with decreasing entropy (increasing
negentropy), but actually predict it in the very long run.
Note that if the wind-tree molecules are enclosed in a box-shaped container
of finite size, whose flat walls are either perpendicular or parallel to the the
motions of any given P molecule, then such a molecule that (elastically) strikes
a wall of the container will retrace its path until it again hits a container wall at
some other point, after which it again retraces its path to the original point on
the wall. This shows that the motion of every individual P molecule is periodic
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(since P molecules that never strike a wall clearly have periodic motion) and
therefore the motion of the complete system is quasi-periodic. Suppose again
the initial t0 state of the system corresponds to all the P molecules moving in
direction (1). When a time has elapsed corresponding to the period τ of the
whole system, all the P molecules will once more be moving in direction (1),
but consider the situation at a time slightly before that, viz. t0 + τ −∆t, which
shall be denoted by τ−. In a variation of the argument used above in the context
of the Loschmidt argument, we must have that of the possible Nij(∆t) those
where j = 2, 3, 4 must vanish, and this is inconsistent with the requirement that
Nij(∆t) = Nik(∆t) = kfi(τ−). So the Collision Assumption cannot hold at
all times. This argument, like that of Loschmidt and Culverwell, requires that
the dynamics be time reversal invariant. But appealing directly to the Poincare´
recurrence theorem in this context requires weaker assumptions, weaker even
than those in the Loschmidt argument and as weak as those in the Zermelo
argument found in the last subsection.
5.3.1 The recurrence theorem
Suppose again we have a dynamical system 〈Γ,A, µ, Tt〉, with the measure µ
preserved by the flow Tt, and µ (Γ) <∞.
Theorem: Almost all points in the phase space define orbits which return
arbitrarily closely to the initial point. More specifically, consider an arbitrary
measurable set g in the σ-algebra A and some arbitrary finite real number τ .47
The subset g¯ of g that contains all the points x in g such that Ttx /∈ g, for any
finite t > τ , has measure zero: µ(g¯) = 0.
We are aware of two kinds of proof in the literature. The first is some
variant of Zermelo’s own 1896 proof, and is given (in varying degrees of rigour)
in a number of modern texts. It uses the sets G (the entire future development
of g as in section 5.2.2 above) and Gτ , the entire future development of Tτ (g).
It shows that µ(Gτ ) = µ(G), and thus that there are states in g that return to
g after some time t ≥ τ . That the set of such recurring states is dense in g is
then established by appeal to the continuity of the flow.
In fact, it can be shown that continuity can be replaced by the weaker condi-
tion that the flow is measurable; this is established in Appendix C below which
contains a careful reworking of the Zermelo-type proof. It is worth stressing
that in such a proof the semi-group property of the flow is required, but not its
reversibility nor indeed even its invertibility.
The second kind of proof found in the literature48 starts by establishing the
following lemma.
Lemma. Consider the nth time-development of the set g¯ of non-recurring
points, represented by Tnτ (g¯), where n is any any positive integer, and τ is
some fixed finite period of time. The sequence of such developments does not
intersect itself, i.e. for every n,m ≥ 0 and n 6= m, Tnτ (g¯) ∩ Tmτ (g¯) = ∅.
47Thinking of τ as being the time, in suitable units, taken for all the points in g to leave
g under the flow makes the physical meaning of the theorem more intuitive, and makes τ
characteristic of the system. But the mathematical theorem goes through for arbitrary τ .
48See Schulman (1997), pp. 70, 71.
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The proof continues by introducing the set G¯ formed from the union of all
these developments:
G¯ =
⋃
n
Tnτ (g¯). (14)
Since all the developments are disjoint, then the volume of the sum is the sum
of the volumes:
µ(G¯) =
∑
n
µ(Tnτ (g˜)). (15)
But because of the measure-preserving nature of the flow, this sum must be
infinite when µ(g¯) 6= 0, which contradicts our initial assumption that the volume
of the whole available space is finite: µ (Γ) <∞. So µ(g¯) = 0.
Standardly, the lemma above is proven by appeal to the invertibility of Tt, a
property of the flow that is not assumed in the Zermelo-type proof. In fact, the
Lemma is not needed; a weaker lemma, which says that the developments Tnτ (g¯)
have intersection of zero measure, is all that is required and here invertibility is
not needed. This is spelt out in Appendix D below.
It is obvious that the recurrence theorem poses a threat to the H-theorem:
in the course of time there will be as many occasions in which H increases
as those in which it decreases. For a rigorous demonstration that no forever
non-decreasing function S on the (finite) phase space can be compatible with
the recurrence result, see Zermelo (1896a) and Olsen (1993).49 The recurrence
theorem may be regarded as stronger than the Zermelo result described in the
section 5.2.2; it demonstrates strictly irreversible behaviour is impossible even
if a physically meaningful entropy-related function is not definable for non-
equilibrium states.
5.4 Comparing the reversibility and recurrence objections
It is sometimes claimed that both objections show, in their different ways, that
the H-theorem is incompatible with the laws of the micro-mechanics of a gas.50
(Of course, a theorem is a theorem, and it can only be its interpretation that
is incompatible with kinetic theory.51) But is this so in Boltzmann’s case? Do
the two objections reach the same damning verdict on his use of the theorem,
differing only in the evidence they bring to bear on the case?
What the Loschmidt objection establishes, given the symmetric nature of
the dynamics, is, to repeat, that there are states of the gas such that its ensuing
behaviour involves an increase in H . Now what the H-theorem implies, assum-
ing that the SZA is valid at all times, namely a certain monotonic behaviour
in H , corresponds to what we actually observe. So the question is now: why
doesn’t the non-thermodynamic behaviour manifest itself? What the Loschmidt
objection does is to demonstrate that Boltzmann’s use of the H-theorem is se-
riously incomplete. First, there is no reason given as to why the SZA holds
for pre-collision velocities rather than post-collision ones.52 But secondly, and
49For a defense of the view that the recurrence theorem is not inconsistent with monotonic
increase of entropy, see Mackey (1992), pp. 45, 46 and chapter 7. We note that Mackey defines
entropy relative to an ensemble of systems, in contrast to the present discussion.
50See for example, Sklar (1993), pp. 36, 37.
51It is clear that what Sklar (ibid) meant was Boltzmann’s use of the theorem; see p. 37.
52Price (1996), p. 40, stresses this point.
17
more to the point, so far there is no categorical reason to think that it could not
be a contingent fact (unexplained for sure) that the SZA in its standard form
holds at all times. (Indeed, this was Burbury’s position in 1894-5, as we shall
soon see.) In this light, the H-theorem, or rather Boltzmann’s use of it, is not
so much incompatible with the laws of micro-mechanics as ad hoc, or at least
incomplete.
But the recurrence theorem categorically rules out the possibility that the
SZA can hold for all future time, at least for some initial states of the gas,
does it not? It might seem, then, that Zermelo’s objection is stronger than
Loschmidt’s on two grounds. First, it requires the semi-group property in the
dynamics, but not reversibility (which the Loschmidt argument presupposes),
nor even invertibility, as we have seen. Second, the former excludes a possibility
left open by the reversibility objection.53 But some care needs to be exercised
in justifying this second claim.
Commentators sometimes either take the Poincare´ theorem to establish that
finite mechanical systems are bound to exhibit recurrent behaviour given enough
time54, or at least do so with probability one.55 But so far in the present anal-
ysis, no notion of probability has been introduced. In particular, no connection
between the measure µ on the phase space and probability has explicitly been
assumed. Is it needed? Is it not enough to establish, as the recurrence theorem
does, that at least one point in any neighbourhood A in the phase space corre-
sponds to an orbit that returns to A in a finite time? The answer is no, at least
if the Zermelo objection is taken to be stronger than Loschmidt’s.
The existence of such recurring orbits will be of little import, if they are not
shown to be typical orbits for the kinds of systems we encounter in the world.56
But for this to be the case, we need to endow the measure with a probabilistic
significance, so as to conclude that the non-recurring orbits have negligible,
ideally zero, probability of obtaining for real gases no matter how much time
is available. We have moved away from purely mechanical considerations, and
this state of affairs surely clouds the issue as to whether the Zermelo’s objection
is stronger than Loschmidt’s, at least in the second sense above.57
This brings us to another difference between the analyses given by Poincare´
and Zermelo. In his 1893 paper, Poincare´ never mentions the measure-zero
53This point of view seems to be defended in Zermelo (1896a); see also Price (1996), p. 33.
54ibid.
55See for example Albert (2000), p. 76.
56This remark may seem perverse, given the stupendously large Poincare´ recurrence times
for typical thermodynamical systems compared even with the age of the universe. Indeed this
consideration has led some commentators to assert that the recurrence theorem is irrelevant
to the question of the validity of the H-theorem. (See, for example, Zeh (2001), pp. 39, 40.)
But we are adopting a literal reading of the H-theorem, in which it is claimed that once the
SZA holds, it holds for all future time. Even if a more pragmatic reading of the H-theorem
need not concern itself with the recurrence theorem, it nonetheless leaves obscure the issue as
to how far into the future the validity of the theorem extends.
57A word is in order concerning the assumption that µ (Γ) < ∞, i.e. that the measure
of the available part of the phase space is finite. Can this assumption be justified without
introducing probability into the story? In the special case of a gas with Hamiltonian flow,
the system is normally assumed to be contained in a finite spatial volume, and its energy
is assumed to be bounded from above and from below. This is enough to ensure that the
Lebesgue measure of the energy hypersurface in the phase space is finite; recall that it is
the Lebesque measure that is preserved under the flow. So it seems natural to impose a
generalized version of this condition for arbitrary dynamical systems before any probabilistic
interpretation of the measure function µ is brought in.
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issue. Here is how he describes, or rather over-simplifies, his recurrence result:
A theorem, easy to prove, tells us that a bounded world, governed
only by the laws of mechanics, will always pass through a state very
close to its initial state.58
This is quite different from the treatment in Poincare´’s 1890 monograph, where
he takes pains to give a “precise definition” of probability based effectively on
phase-space measure, with respect to which the non-recurring cases are the
exception and not the rule.
Zermelo, on the other hand, devotes space in his 1896 paper to a discussion of
the “singular” phases which avoid sitting on (quasi-) recurrent orbits. He admits
that the recurrence theorem can be considered consistent with the second law
(and hence presumably the H-theorem) if
only those [singular] initial states that lead to irreversible pro-
cesses are actually realized in nature, despite their smaller number,
while the other states, which from a mathematical viewpoint are
more probable, actually do not occur.59
Needless to say, Zermelo rejects this possibility, and does so on a number of
grounds. His principal reasons, which are far from conclusive, are two-fold.
First, such selection on the part of Nature of special initial states is claimed to
be contrary to the spirit of the mechanical world-view, which supposedly gives
all elements of the phase space equal status qua potential states of the system.
Second, arbitrarily small perturbations of singular states lead to the ”probable”
states associated with recurrent orbits. Since, says Zermelo more controversially,
the laws of nature do not refer to “precise quantities or processes”, singularities
of this kind “exist only as abstract limiting cases”. It is noteworthy that Zermelo
does not give the notion of probability here anything more than mathematical
significance.
6 A little more history: the Nature debate of
the 1890s
The first responses to Culverwell’s 1894 plea, based on the reversibility objec-
tion, for clarification of the status of the H-theorem included separate comments
by Watson, Burbury and Bryan which are worth examining briefly.
Watson, whose treatment of the H-theorem it will be recalled had led to
Culverwell’s complaint, accepted the latter’s point that the dynamically al-
lowed behaviour of a gas is reversible, but flatly refused to accept that the
monotonic decrease of H would be altered by the reversal of the velocities of
the molecules!60
The remarkable Burbury, a mathematician-barrister and Fellow of the Royal
Society, for whom mathematical physics was a “scientific recreation”61, thought
58Poincare´ (1893).
59Zermelo (1896a), p. 215.
60Watson (1894).
61See Bryan (1913) and footnote 66 below. As Price (2003) notes, Burbury turned increas-
ingly to mathematical physics as deafness eroded his effectiveness as a barrister; see also Bryan
(1913).
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that Culverwell had questioned the very consistency of the H-theorem. He
thought that Culverwell’s claim was that both H-increasing and H-decreasing
behaviour are simultaneously predicted on the basis of the theorem itself, an
obvious contradiction. This was probably not Culverwell’s point, but Burbury’s
analysis led to a useful (though initially confused) insight. Burbury first claimed,
as he had done in other 1894 papers in the Philosophical Magazine, that the
H-theorem relies critically on a collisions-related assumption which he called
“condition A”, which is not equivalent to the SZA but allowed him to provide
a simplified proof of the theorem. Later in the debate, he seemed to conflate
this assumption with the SZA, and Boltzmann took Burbury to mean the SZA
from the outset.62 At any rate, what Burbury showed was this. Consider the
post-collision velocities of all the molecules involved in collisions occurring at a
given time t0, and suppose that Condition A holds in reverse for these velocities.
Then this is consistent with Condition A holding immediately before t0 for the
forward velocities only if the system was already in the equilibrium Maxwell-
Boltzmann distribution. And so, said Burbury, “Boltzmann’s theorem can be
applied to both motions [forward and reversed] only on condition that it has no
effect on either.”63
In the non-equilibrium case then, Burbury saw the time-asymmetrical na-
ture of Condition A as preventing the H-theorem from being applied to both
the direct and reversed motions, and hence defusing any contradiction in the
theorem.64 Burbury conceded that an increase in H is possible at times in which
Condition A fails to hold, but seems to have regarded such occurrences as rare
at best. He admitted that the reason for this was unclear, but speculated that
the permanent validity of Condition A may ultimately be due to interactions of
the system with the environment.65 It is worth remarking that Burbury showed
himself to be more comfortable with the H-theorem in the Nature debate than
he did privately some years later. In 1901 he wrote this in a letter to a colleague:
Now I say that the law has never been proved at all, except
as a deduction from Boltzmann’s assumption A. If it has ever been
proved, or attempted, will you tell me where? Tait, Watson, Maxwell,
Weinstein, all make Boltzmann’s assumption. Further, there is no
evidence whatever for Boltzmann’s assumption, except that it leads
to the law of equal partition. We are in a vicious circle. The tortoise
is supported on the back of the elephant, and when I ask what the
elephant is supported on they say it is suspended from the tortoise.66
62Burbury (1894) wrote: “If the collision coordinates be taken at random, then the following
condition holds, viz:—For any given direction of R [the relativity velocity of the colliding
molecules] before collision, all directions after collision are equally probable. Call this condition
A.” A detailed analysis of the difference between Condition A and the SZA would take us too
far afield; for more discussion see Dias (1994).
63Burbury (1895a) p. 320
64Burbury (1894).
65See Burbury (1894), and particularly (1895b). Note that in his important 1955 review
paper on the foundations of statistical mechanics, ter Haar (ibid.) regards the fact that
the SZA holds symmetrically only if the system is in equilibrium as providing a variant of
the Loschmidt reversibility objection. This is an interesting stance, but it was clearly not
Burbury’s. The latter implicitly assumed the existence of an external arrow of time, with
respect to which Condition A (hopefully) held continuously; the empirical fact that outside of
equilibrium it did not hold in the reverse temporal sense was not of concern to him in 1894.
66This excerpt from the 1901 letter was published in Burbury’s obituary which appeared in
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Before leaving Burbury’s contribution to the debate, we note that in their
1911 encyclopedia article, the Ehrenfests derived a ‘consistency’ result analogous
to Burbury’s but related to the Collision Assumption in the context of their
wind-tree model;67 in Appendix E below is found a somewhat more systematic
proof of this result.68)
Turning now to Bryan, his main point seems to have been that if a gas is
approaching the Maxwell-Boltzmann distribution, it is practically impossible
to “project the molecules in their reversed motions with sufficient accuracy to
retrace their steps for more than a very few collisions”.69 This is of course to
concede (as Burbury did) that negentropy can in principle increase, but to assert
it can do so in practice only for very short times, if at all—without appealing
to any external influences.
In all cases, Culverwell was unimpressed.70 As for Watson’s position, Cul-
verwell noted that no one seemed to agree with it, and correctly concluded that
indeed it would “take away all physical meaning to the H theorem”. It is not
entirely clear whether Culverwell understood the point of Burbury’s attempt
to rescue the consistency of the H-theorem. Concerning Bryan’s reply, Culver-
well thought his claim was question begging, and thus concluded that without
the introduction of “assumptions about averages, probability, or irreversibility”,
Watson’s treatment of the H-theorem cannot be valid.71 (The contributions of
Boltzmann to the debate will be mentioned later.)
6.1 Price’s view of the debate: a critique
We finish this section by critically examining some remarks related to the Nature
debate made by Huw Price in his justly influential 1996 book Time’s Arrow and
Archimedes’ Point.
Price regards Culverwell’s critique of the H-theorem as more penetrating
than Loschmidt’s.
Culverwell seems to have seen more clearly than any of his pre-
decessors the paradoxical nature of the claim to have derived an
asymmetric conclusion—even of a statistical nature—from the sym-
metric foundations of classical mechanics. (our emphasis)72
Now it is difficult to reconcile this claim (in particular the reference to a pos-
sible statistical mode of reasoning) with the quotation we have just given from
the Proceedings of the Royal Society in 1913, with the author (to whom the letter was origi-
nally written) referred to only as “GHB”. In listing the Burbury obituary in our bibliography,
we assume the author is G. H. Bryan, who was, like Burbury, a Fellow of the Royal Society
in 1901, as well as one of the participants in the earlier Nature debate on the H-theorem, as
we have seen. It is also known that prior to 1901, the two men had already corresponded;
see Dias (1994). (Bryan made his fame largely through his contributions to the physics of
flight, but some of his earliest contributions were to thermodynamics and the kinetic theory
of gases; his particular interest in the role of the partition theorem in Maxwell’s work led to a
joint publication with Boltzmann in 1895.) For further details of Burbury’s post 1901 views
on the H-theorem, see Price (2003).
67See Ehrenfest and Ehrenfest (1912), footnote 65, pp. 85, 86.
68Another treatment involving a different model is found in ter Haar (1955), p. 296.
69Bryan 1894.
70Culverwell (1894b).
71See the quotation preceding the abstract of the present paper. We return to the issue of
the probabilistic nature, or lack-thereof, of the H-theorem in section 7.
72Price (1996), p. 31.
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Culverwell (1894b). But more to the point is Price’s own view of the nature of
the real problem associated with the H-theorem.
Price praises Boltzmann for coming to see that the problem is one of the
asymmetry involved in the theorem, and not the issue of its universal validity
(or whether it admits of exceptions). But this distinction, as will be clear from
reading Price’s text, only makes sense in terms of a probabilistic reading of the
theorem (of which more in section 8 below). Culverwell on the other hand is
addressing the original form of the H-theorem, and sees the introduction of a
probabilistic element as a possible solution to the problem the theorem poses.
The problem itself for Culverwell, as it is for Loschmidt, is that the original proof
“would, if true, apply to a system obtained by reversing the velocities when the
permanent configuration had been very nearly reached. Such a system would
return its path and go further and further from the permanent configuration.”73
As far as Burbury is concerned, Price first regards his comments as missing
the point. Even though Burbury “draws attention to the crucial role of the
independence assumption [SZA]”, he is mistaken, according to Price, to place
emphasis on the justification of the continuous validity of the SZA over time.74
Now we saw above that in fact Burbury did not (at least initially in the Nature
debate) draw attention to the SZA at all, but concentrated on the role of his
Condition A. However, for the sake of argument, let us (as Burbury eventually
seems to have done) conflate the two conditions. The relevant question is why
Price thinks Burbury’s concern with the durability of the SZA over time is
mistaken. The answer is that for Price, the real concern is with the time-
asymmetric nature of the SZA whenever it holds. Note that this is not the
notion of asymmetry that Burbury himself stresses, which we discussed above,
and which Price does not mention. It is not, to be specific, related to the fact
that the SZA cannot successively run in both temporal directions without the
system being in equilibrium, in the precise sense above. Price is concerned rather
with the fact that the SZA, at the time in which it is taken to hold, refers to
the pre-collision state of the gas, not its post-collision condition. It looks to the
future and not to the past. Burbury, though astute, is being “sidetracked”: his
worry about sustaining the SZA over time “isn’t a concern about the asymmetry
reflected in [SZA] ... itself, ... for it doesn’t raise any objection to the assumption
that the molecules are uncorrelated before they begin to interact.”75
This is true as far as it goes, but in our view Burbury was right to stress
the issue of the continuing validity of the SZA over time, in the context of the
original H-theorem. The SZA is a constraint on the state of a gas at a given
time. For an isolated gas, over times comparable to the recurrence time there
will be on average at least as many instants at which it fails to hold as there
are in which it holds. The recurrence theorem, to repeat, ensures that SZA
cannot hold at all times. But in order to get an arrow of time of the kind
Boltzmann originally wanted, there could be no exceptions, or only rare ones,
to the validity of the SZA, and Burbury was right to stress this point. His
speculative suggestion that it may be so because the gas is not after all strictly
isolated is open to criticism, as Price himself notes.76 But the suggestion also
happens to be in conflict with one of the key assumptions of the recurrence
73Culverwell (1894a).
74Price (1996), p. 31.
75Price (1996), p. 31.
76Price (1996), p. 32.
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theorem, namely the semi-group property of the measure-preserving flow.
It is noteworthy that in his final conclusions about the significance of the
H-theorem, Price deliberately shifts his ground and denies that the real problem
with the SZA is that it is time-asymmetric (despite, as we have seen, having
berated Burbury for not being troubled by this). Now, the real problem is that
SZA, and other conditions like it in the literature, fail in reverse.
After all, if they did not fail in reverse then the [H-] theorem could be
applied in reverse, to “show” that entropy increases (or H decreases)
toward the past, as well as toward the future. Since it is the fact that
entropy does not behave in that way toward the past that actually
requires explanation; it is the failure of the required assumptions in
that direction that should be the focus of attention.77
There is no doubt that Price has a valid point here, but by insisting on the
continual validity of SZA over time, Burbury was precisely addressing the issue
Price is emphasizing. If (for whatever reason) the SZA were to hold for a
significant timescale, then by Burbury’s own argumentation its time reverse
cannot hold in the same period unless the system is in equilibrium.
7 When does the Stosszahlansatz hold?
It is striking how many distinct views have been expressed concerning the do-
main of validity of the SZA.
(i) It was in his third contribution to the 1890s Nature debate that Bur-
bury expressed his doubts most strongly about the permanent validity of the
SZA, when the system is “finite, and to be left to itself unaffected by external
disturbances”.78 He reiterates his view that it is only by resorting to constant
“disturbances from without” that the SZA will be kept “in working order”, so
as to ensure the monotonic decrease in H . Burbury’s note elicited a reply from
Boltzmann, also published in Nature.79
Boltzmann did not agree that external disturbances are necessary to keep the
SZA in working order over time. Although he accepted that such permanence
was not “a mechanical necessity”, he argued that when the system is very large
and the mean (free) path of molecules is very large compared to the mean dis-
tance between two neighbouring molecules, the SZA would be perpetuated over
time, at least with high probability. We return to the issue of Boltzmann’s post-
1872 probabilistic reading of the H-theorem in section 8 below; in the meantime
we note that it is very hard to reconcile Boltzmann’s answer to Burbury with
his (Boltzmann’s) notion of a time-symmetric fluctuating H-curve (see below).
(ii) A claim that seems to have originated in Huang’s 1963 textbook on
statistical mechanics, and one repeated by Davies in 1974, is that outside of
equilibrium the H-theorem can hold only at times corresponding to local peaks
of the H curve.80 Huang’s argument is simple: the H-theorem says that if at
77Price (1996), p. 40. See also Price (2006).
78Burbury (1895). As before, we are not distinguishing here between the SZA and Condition
A, which is what Burbury actually refers to.
79Boltzmann (1895b).
80See Huang (1963) and its 1987 edition, pp. 85 and 87 respectively. Huang attributes
the argument to unpublished work by F.E. Low. It is repeated in Davies (1974), p. 59; one
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time t0 the SZA holds, then dH/dt ≤ 0 at t0 + ǫ (ǫ→ 0), and it would seem to
follow on grounds of symmetry that dH/dt ≥ 0 at t0 − ǫ.81
In the context of our treatment above of the H-theorem, Huang’s conclusion
would be correct if, supposing the SZA is valid at a given time, it must likewise
be valid for the state of the gas obtained by reversing the velocities of all the
molecules that have just been involved in collisions at that time.82 This claim
is far from obviously true, and Eggarter in 1973 actually constructed a model
of colliding particles for which the SZA is valid at all times and its time reverse
never valid.83 However, as Eggarter noted, Huang actually assumes in his treat-
ment of the H-theorem the condition of uncorrelated velocities for all pairs of
molecules of the gas, and not just those about to collide at the time in ques-
tion. This “molecular chaos” condition is indeed time symmetric and Eggarter
seems to agree with Huang that if it holds at a given time, the state of the gas
will correspond to a local peak in the H curve—though Eggarter stresses that
now there is nothing in the H-theorem that establishes an average decrease of
H over time. By replacing the SZA with the stronger condition of “molecular
chaos” in this sense, all hope of mechanically modelling the time-asymmetric,
spontaneous approach of a gas to equilibrium is lost.
But the situation is even worse than this. What both Huang and Eggarter
seemed to have overlooked is that this symmetric molecular chaos condition
does not imply the SZA either in the forwards or backwards sense in time. The
set of pairs of molecules about to collide (or having just collided) at the time
in question may in principle exhibit correlations in their velocities even when
the set of all pairs of molecules fails to do so. Thus molecular chaos does not
automatically lead to dH/dt ≤ 0 at t0 + ǫ (nor to dH/dt ≥ 0 for t0 − ǫ).84
(iii) It has recently been claimed by Lockwood, relying in part on the ar-
guments given by Burbury in 1895, that the Stosszahlansatz can only hold at
equilibrium.85 But this claim is also incorrect, and based on a misreading of
Burbury’s logic. Lockwood argues that collisions must generate correlations
between molecules; the correlations being a kind of ‘memory’ of the collision.
Time reversal invariance of the theory is then taken to imply that pre-collision
correlations must exist. Instead of concluding that the Stosszahlansatz cannot
ever hold, Lockwood concludes that it holds only when Boltzmann’s H-function
is constant, which he associates with equilibrium. There are a number of non-
sequiturs in this reasoning; it is enough to note that a clear-cut refutation of
Lockwood’s conclusion is found in (iv) below.
(iv) In his 1973 lectures on statistical mechanics, Pauli notes86 that the
Stosszahlansatz “picks out a specific direction of time”, and later says of his
version of the H-theorem:
might surmise that Davies, who cites Huang’s book in another context, did not discover it
independently.
81Indeed in Huang (1963), p. 85, it is claimed that the H-theorem is actually time-reversal
invariant.
82Note that the issue that Huang is raising is different to that of the Ehrenfests and our
Appendix F; Huang is concerned with the conditions under which SZA holds at a given time
for pairs of molecules just about to collide, and its time reverse holds at the same time for
(generally different) pairs of molecules that have just collided.
83Eggarter (1973).
84This point was clarified in discussions with Jos Uffink.
85See Lockwood (2005), p. 208, and Burbury (1895); Lockwood wrongly states that the
value of Boltzmann’s H-function is zero at equilibrium.
86Pauli (1973), p. 8
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What we have calculated by means of the Stosszahlansatz is not valid
for a single gas; it is valid only for a statistical ensemble. With a sta-
tistical ensemble, the values of [H ],87 necessarily discrete for a single
gas, are replaced by a continuous distribution of values which satis-
fies the H-theorem. However, when we thermodynamically observe
irreversibility, the situation is always such that the distribution of
positions and velocities approaches the equilibrium distribution with
overwhelming probability, though small fluctuations continually oc-
cur.88
Pauli is suggesting that for the single gas, behaviour consistent with the
H-theorem is actually to be understood as overwhelmingly probable, but not
certain, and we return to this issue in the next section. But he seems to be
suggesting that if we consider an infinite ensemble of gases, the H-theorem can
be rescued if now defined relative to a ‘distribution’ of values ofH . It is not clear
precisely what Pauli has in mind here. It is certainly the case that Boltzmann
himself never provided a systematic statistical version of the H-theorem.89
A statistical simulation of the wind-tree model was provided by Rechtman et
al. in 1991.90 These authors used two different computer programs to simulate
the model, with the P -molecules moving discretely on a regular square lattice
with periodic boundary conditions. The simulation was repeated 50 times, in
each case with 2000 P - and 500 Q-molecules (the latter having sides of 2
√
2) on
a lattice of 45,000 sites. In each run of 1000 steps the positions of both types
of molecules was re-randomized, but the initial state corresponded to all the
P -molecules moving in direction (1) above.
In a typical run the system reached equilibrium after about 100 steps, i.e.
within the first 10% of the run. By defining suitable measures of deviation from
the Collision Assumption, Rechtman et al. were able to show that on average
over the ensemble of runs, not more than 2% of the P -molecules violate the
condition at any step. Rechtman et al. regarded this result as “remarkable”.
But what does this tell us about the behaviour in a single run? Here we
see (typically) a quick approach to equilibrium which must be followed, after a
sufficient number (much larger than 1000) of steps, by a return to the initial
state. The presupposition that the initial approach to equilibrium for a single
gas gains some kind of explanation by way of the statistical analysis of the
ensemble is, of course, debatable—as is the whole approach initiated by Gibbs
that the behaviour of individual systems can be understood by studying the
behaviour of a representative ensemble.
The study of Rechtman et al. is consistent with the contention that the SZA
can hold when the system is not in equilibrium. It may also be read as suggesting
that the SZA is not a necessary condition for thermodynamic behaviour, i.e. for
H to decrease in the next instant.
87Actually, the term here is H, which is the spatial integral of the H function; Pauli’s
treatment does not presuppose that the distribution is position independent.
88ibid., pp. 23,4.
89See Uffink (2004), section 5.3.
90Rechtman et al. (1991).
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8 Boltzmann’s probabilistic turn
8.1 Boltzmann
Boltzmann made two contributions to the Nature debate in the 1890s. As we
saw in the previous section, he argued pace Burbury that the persistence of
the validity of SZA over time can be justified without appeal to disturbances
originating from outside the system. But the more important clarification— and
one without which Boltzmann’s response to Burbury cannot be fully understood
— came in an earlier and lengthier paper, published on February 28, 1895. The
arguments in this paper are now well-known. For our purposes, what is relevant
is first Boltzmann’s clarification that
It can never be proved from the equations of motion alone, that the
minimum function H must always decrease. It can only be deduced
from the laws of probability, that if the initial state is not specially
arranged for a certain purpose, but haphazard governs freely, the
probability that H decreases is always greater than that it decreases.
... What I have proved in my papers is as follows: It is extremely
probable that H is very near to its minimum value; if it greater,
it may increase or decrease, but the probability that it decreases is
always greater. Thus, if I obtain a certain value for dH/dt, this result
does not hold for every time element dt, but it is only an average
value.91
The detailed probabilistic analysis of the fluctuating nature of H in this
paper, which Boltzmann attributes to his assistant Dr Schuetz, is essentially
that given so famously and in more detail in the Ehrenfest’s 1912 encyclopedia
article (who reserve the term“molecular chaos” for the probabilistic version of
the SZA).92 At any rate, in his 1895 reply to Culverwell et al., Boltzmann is
reiterating the probabilistic position he adopted in his first 1877 paper93 in
response to Loschmidt’s objection to the original form of the H-theorem, which
had escaped the notice of his intended readers. In broad terms, Boltzmann
had already done in 1877 what Culverwell was calling for in 1894 (although
the extent to which the details of Boltzmann’s position would have satisfied
Culverwell remains unclear).
Recall that in 1872, Boltzmann gives no indication that the SZA could fail;
he wrote then of his H-theorem
It has thus been rigorously proved that, whatever may be the
initial distribution of kinetic energy, in the course of a very long time
it must always necessarily approach the one found by Maxwell.94
But from 1877 such a process of equilibration becomes for Boltzmann merely
probable (and as we have seen in 1895 its persistence over time depends on the
size of the gas and in particular the relative sizes of the mean free path and dis-
tances between neighbouring molecules). The change in thinking is particularly
evident in the treatment of the homogeneity of the gas. For Boltzmann, in 1872,
91Boltzmann (1895a).
92See also Price (2006), section 6.
93Boltzmann (1877a).
94Boltzmann (1872).
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once this condition is achieved it is permanent. But in 1877, he flatly denies
such permanence for arbitrary initial states. The understanding of irreversibility
has taken on a new form, despite some very misleading remarks by Boltzmann
to the contrary. The significance of this shift of reasoning on Boltzmann’s part
cannot be overstressed; although some commentators have appreciated it, par-
ticularly the Ehrenfests in 1912, D. ter Haar in 195595, Kuhn in 197896, and
most systematically Uffink97, it seems still not to be universally understood.
For example, in their lively 2002 discussion of the H-theorem, Emch and Liu
note, correctly, that in the light of the reversibility objection Boltzmann stressed
in the mid-nineties that the H-theorem “has the character of a statistical truth”,
and that the second law of thermodynamics is “from a molecular point of view,
merely a statistical law.” They write further:
The additional, somewhat hidden, assumption of statistical nature in
Boltzmann’s work is often referred to as Boltzmann’s Stosszahlansatz.
When Boltzmann introduced it, it might have been somewhat buried
in the argument, but there can be no doubt that Boltzmann later
recognized the probabilistic – i.e. non-mechanistic – component in
the theory ...98
But is there is not a confusion here? Boltzmann did not belatedly come to
the conclusion in the mid-nineties that the SZA was born with an intrinsically
probabilistic pedigree. It is true that this assumption is non-mechanistic in the
sense that it does not follow from the postulated dynamics of the gas molecules.
And it is true that Boltzmann spoke in his original 1872 paper of the (normal-
ized) distribution function f(r,v, t) as a probability.99 But the SZA (and the
related Collision Assumption in the wind-tree model) concerns the state of a
single gas, not an ensemble of such gases, and nor does it have anything to do
with our ignorance of the detailed configuration of the system when N is large.
To say, as Boltzmann did in 1877 and in the 1890s, that the condition is only
probably the case, is not to say that the condition itself has some intrinsically
probabilistic meaning. When Boltzmann, in his final 1895 response to Burbury
concerning the persistence of the SZA over time, wrote that “Condition A is
simply this, that the laws of probability are applicable for finding the number of
collisions”, he was using the notion of probability in a qualitatively different way
to that found in his original 1872 reasoning. It was the way that Maxwell had
been describing the probabilistic nature of the second law of thermodynamics
already for some years, and which he would articulate clearly again in his 1878
review of P. G. Tait’s Sketch of Thermodynamics :
95See ter Haar (1955) and the quote from this article appearing at the beginning of the
present paper. As Uffink (2007) notes, ter Haar is referring to the second of the 1877 papers
of Boltzmann.
96See Kuhn (1978), chapter II; we have comments on Kuhn’s analysis below.
97Uffink in his (2007) is concerned not just with the real shift in Boltzmann’s thinking but
the confusing business of Boltzmann’s own recognition of this shift in the years following 1877.
Uffink warns, p. 10, that “Boltzmann himself never indicated a clear distinction between these
two different theories [kinetic theory of gases and statistical mechanics], and any attempt
to draw a demarcation at an exact location in his work seems somewhat arbitrary.” But
Uffink ibid, section 4, is quite categorical that in his two 1877 papers, Boltzmann’s thinking
underwent a major shift in relation to that in his 1872 paper.
98Emch and Liu (2002), p. ??.
99See Uffink (2004), section ??
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If we ... consider a finite number of molecules, even if the system
to which they belong contains an infinite number, the average prop-
erties of this group . . . are still every now and then deviating very
considerably from the theoretical mean of the whole system . . .
Hence the second law of thermodynamics is continually being
violated, and that to a considerable extent, in any sufficiently small
group of molecules belonging to a real body. As the number of
molecules in the group is increased, the deviations from the mean of
the whole become smaller and less frequent; and when the number is
increased till the group includes a sensible portion of the body, the
probability of a measurable variation from the mean occurring in a
finite number of years becomes so small that it may be regarded as
practically an impossibility.
This calculation belongs of course to molecular theory and not to
pure thermodynamics, but it shows that we have reason for believing
the truth of the second law to be of the nature of a strong probability,
which, though it falls short of certainty by less than any assignable
quantity, is not an absolute certainty.
Several attempts have been made to deduce the second law from
purely dynamical principles, such as Hamilton’s principle, and with-
out the introduction of an element of probability. If we are right in
what has been said above, no deduction of this kind, however ap-
parently satisfactory, can be a sufficient explanation of the second
law.100
Now in his elegant 1973 study of Boltzmann’s debt to Helmoltz, Martin
Klein regards Boltzmann’s work in the early 1870s as the birth of statistical
mechanics. Boltzmann had
learned fromMaxwell that it was essential to describe a gas by statis-
tical methods, that the statistical distribution of molecular velocities
was basic to any analysis of the properties of a macroscopic system.
Boltzmann made this approach his own, generalizing it and applying
it to new problems. Foremost among these was the problem he had
started with, and in 1871, Boltzmann gave a new “analytical proof of
the second law”. This time the second law, or rather those aspects of
the second law that deal with equilibrium and reversible processes,
appeared as theorems in a new and as yet unnamed discipline—
statistical mechanics. The laws of probability played as essential a
part as the laws of mechanics in the new explanation of the second
law of thermodynamics.101
Klein stresses that Maxwell “had already seen to the heart of the matter several
years ago” when Maxwell stressed in 1871 in his Theory of Heat that the second
law had only a probabilistic validity. But this was precisely what Boltzmann
had not said in the early 1870s, and Klein himself recognizes that it was only in
1877, under pressure from Loschmidt’s objection, that Boltzmann constructed
a “fully statistical interpretation of the second law”.102
100Maxwell (1878), p. 280.
101Klein (1973), p. 62.
102Ibid, p. 63.
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We have borrowed this terminology in the title of our paper. “Fully statis-
tical mechanics” for us represents the introduction of considerations that tran-
scend claims about the frequencies or distributions of molecules in position or
velocity space for a given finite gas at a given time— in other words, that tran-
scend assumptions about the actual, as opposed to probable configuration or
evolution of the gas. It is about the transition from counting to expecting. Such
considerations, as is well known, in turn account for the introduction into the
discipline of such varied notions as infinite ensembles or subjective schemes of
inductive inference. It is in going from statistical mechanics to fully statistical
mechanics that the conceptual complexities and obscurities of probability truly
make their appearance.
We finish this subsection with two remarks.
In his detailed 1978 analysis of Boltzmann’s H-theorem, Kuhn argued that
the very dynamical structure of the theorem requires a probabilistic interpreta-
tion of the density function f , something which Boltzmann failed to see in 1872.
Kuhn drew attention to the fact that the density function is coarse-grained, and
hence no deterministic equation of motion can exist for it.103 He stated that
“Boltzmann’s equations for the time rate of change of f and H determine only
average or most probable values. Many other rates of change are compatible
both with the given initial distribution and with mechanics.”104 However, Kuhn
did not spell out how it is that deterministic equations are restored when the f
and H are so interpreted in terms of probable values.105 More to the point, and
as we stressed earlier in the paper, a version of the H-theorem can be given in
the wind-tree model that does not require the differentiability of f or H with
respect to time, and it works without assigning a probabilistic interpretation to
f .
The final point is that as Poincare´ emphasized106, it is only by introducing
a probabilistic element into arguments like the H-theorem, that the mechanical
theory of heat have “any chance of success”, at least in the light of the Zermelo
recurrence objection. But as Poincare´ hinted in 1893, and Zermelo stressed in
1896107, probability is itself not a time-asymmetric notion; in particular the
Schuetz-Boltzmann notion of a fluctuating H-curve for the universe does not
pick out a preferred direction of time.108 With respect to the two great early
objections to the 1872 H-theorem, Boltzmann’s probabilistic ploy was not suf-
ficient to meet the objection it was originally aimed at. It seems Boltzmann
himself may have realized this in 1897.109
8.2 Post-H-theorem Boltzmann: Probability reigns
Both in his (first) 1895 contribution to the Nature debate and in his 1896 re-
ply to Zermelo, Boltzmann claims that a gas approaches equilibrium because
there are many more ways the gas can arrange itself in equilibrium that in
any other state. This now familiar combinatorial argument, which—for better
103Kuhn (1978), p. 45. It should be noted that Kuhn, like Emch and Liu, also argues that
the SZA, in itself, has an intrinsically probabilistic meaning; see pp. 40 and 45.
104Kuhn (1978), p. 45.
105Recall the discussion at the end of section 2.1 above.
106See footnote 22 above.
107See section 4 above.
108See Uffink (2007) section 4, and Torretti (2007) p. 748 in this connection.
109See the last remarks in section 4 above.
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or worse—transcends any dynamical considerations, dates back to Boltzmann’s
1877 work110; these early arguments have received careful critical analyses by
Kuhn and Uffink.111
Let us leave historical niceties aside, and consider the modern version of what
is widely taken to be Boltzmann’s new argument, wherein the SZA is essentially
lost from view. Thus suppose we are given a typical set of measurements we
can make on our dynamical system using macroscopic instruments with finite
sensitivity. This corresponds to a set Σ of “macrovariables”, which allow us
to partition the the phase space Γ into µ-measurable subsets (“macrostates”)
in the standard fashion.112 Now for every phase point ω ∈ Γ, its associated
macrostate M(ω) will have measure µ(M(ω)). The equilibrium macrostate is
defined to be that which has the largest measure. The Boltzmann entropy
associated with an arbitrary macrostateM is defined as SB(M) = k log(µ(M)),
where k is Boltzmann’s constant. It will be assumed that µ is the standard
Lebesgue measure on (the σ-algebra of subsets of) the phase space Γ, or rather
that induced on the constant energy hypersurface ΓE .
Boltzmann’s post-H-theorem version of the second law of thermodynamics
was essentially this:
Principle of probable equilibration (PPE): Suppose that at some time t0, the
Boltzmann entropy SB(t0) of the system is low compared with the entropy of
the equilibrium state. Then for a later times t > t0, it is highly probable that
SB(t) > SB(t0).
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For PPE to hold, it is commonly understood that (i) the flow Tt must be
such that for the overwhelming majority (defined relative to the measure µ)
of microstates ω in the region Mt0 corresponding to the initial low entropy
macrostate, the macrostate Mt(ω) that results from the evolution of ω is such
that µ(Mt(ω)) ≫ µ(Mt0), and (ii) the measure µ is assigned a probabilistic
significance. But claim (i) is highly non-trivial and cries out for justification;
condition (ii) is clearly not enough.114 It behoves us to recall Planck’s 1908
remark (cited by Kuhn in 1978115):
Probability calculus can serve, if nothing is known in advance,
to determine the most probable state. But it cannot serve, if an
improbable [initial] state is given, to compute the following [state].
That is determined not be probability but by mechanics. To main-
tain that change in nature always proceeds from [states of] lower to
higher probability would be totally without foundation.
110Boltzmann (1877b).
111See Kuhn (1978) pp. 46-54, and Uffink (2007), section 4.
112Every phase point in Γ is in exactly one macrostate, while the map Γ to the set of
macrostates is many-one. Every macrostate corresponds to a unique set of values for the
set Σ of “macrovariables”, and every macrostate is invariant under permutations of identical
microsystems.
113It is assumed of course that the interval t − t0 is small compared to the recurrence time
of the system.
114See for example the discussion in Lavis (2005), section 4.2.
115Kuhn (1978), p. 54.
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10 Appendices
A Proof of the H-theorem analogue in the wind-
tree model without differentiability
The log sum inequality116 states that for non-negative numbers a1, a2, . . . , an,
and b1, b2, . . . , bn, then
n∑
i=1
ai log
ai
bi
≥
(
n∑
i=1
ai
)
log
∑n
i=1 ai∑n
i=1 bi
. (16)
with equality iff ai
bi
= constant. When
∑n
i=1 ai =
∑n
i=1 bi, we get
n∑
i=1
bi log bi ≥
n∑
i=1
bi log ai. (17)
Note that these inequalities are independent of the base of the logarithm.
Now, in the interval of time [t0, t0 +∆t], the H-function changes by
∆H =
4∑
i=1
[f ′i ln f
′
i − fi ln fi] , (18)
where (see eqn. (5) above)
f ′i = fi(t0 +∆t) = fi + k∆t(fi+1 + fi−1 − 2fi). (19)
From (18) and (19), after rearranging we get
∆H =
4∑
i=1
[{fi ln f ′i − fi ln fi}+ k∆t(fi+1 + fi−1 − 2fi) ln f ′i ] . (20)
Applying (17) twice in the second (k-dependent) term in the sum, and noting
that
∑4
i=1 fi±1 ln fi±1 =
∑4
i=1 fi ln fi, one infers that the second term is less
than or equal to
2k∆t
4∑
i=1
(fi ln fi − fi ln f ′i). (21)
116We are grateful to Owen Maroney for bringing this inequality to our attention.
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Thus
∆H ≤ (1− 2k∆t)
4∑
i=1
(fi ln f
′
i − fi ln fi). (22)
Given that k∆t is positive, using (17) again we get for sufficiently small k∆t
the desired result
∆H ≤ 0. (23)
Thus, if the Collision Assumption is satisfied, H will be non-increasing.
We do not expect the Collision Assumption to be satisfied exactly at all
times and for all intervals ∆t; indeed, it cannot be satisfied exactly unless
k∆tfi is integral for each i. The H-theorem is relevant, nevertheless, because
H is guaranteed to be non-increasing provided that the Collision Assumption is
approximately satisfied. Define the quantities εij , for j = i± 1, by
Nij(∆t) = k∆t (fi + εij) . (24)
Then, in place of (19), we have
f ′i = fi + k∆t [(fi+1 + fi−1 − 2fi) + (εi+1,i + εi−1,i − εi,i+1 − εi,i−1)] . (25)
The reasoning leading to (22) now gives us,
∆H ≤ (1 − 2k∆t)
4∑
i=1
(fi ln f
′
i − fi ln fi)
+ k∆t
4∑
i=1
(εi+1,i + εi−1,i − εi,i+1 − εi,i−1) ln f ′i . (26)
Unless f ′i = fi for all i (in which case ∆H = 0), the first sum will be negative,
and so, when 2k∆t < 1, we will have ∆H ≤ 0 if all εij are sufficiently small. A
weaker condition suffices: ∆H ≤ 0 if
|(εi+1,i + εi−1,i)− (εi,i+1 + εi,i−1)|
is sufficiently small for all i.
B More Zermelo-type proofs without recurrence
Let 〈Γ,A〉 be a measure space, s : A → R a finitely additive function (that
is, for disjoint A,B ∈ A, s(A ∪ B) = s(A) + s(B)), such that s(Γ) < ∞. Let
T : Γ → Γ be such that s is nondecreasing under the action of T . That is, for
all A ∈ A, s(T (A)) ≥ s(A).
We want to show that, under mild conditions on T , s will be constant under
the action of T—that is, s(T (A)) = s(A) for all A ∈ A.
Theorem B1. If T is a bijection, then s is constant under the action of T .
Proof. Take A ∈ A, and let B = Γ \ A. Since T is a bijection, T (Γ) = Γ, and
T (A) ∩ T (B) = ∅. Therefore,
s(Γ) = s(T (A)) + s(T (B)) = s(A) + s(B). (27)
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If s(T (A)) > s(A), this increase must be compensated for by having s(T (B)) <
s(B), contradicting the assumption that s is nondecreasing. Therefore, s(T (A)) =
s(A).
Theorem B2. If there exists a measure µ on Γ that is conserved under T ,
such that s(A) = 0 whenever µ(A) = 0, then s is constant under the action of
T .
Proof. As before, take A ∈ A, and let B = Γ \ A. Since we’re not assuming
that T is invertible, we can’t conclude that T (A) ∩ T (B) = ∅, but, since µ is
conserved, we can conclude that µ(T (A)∩T (B)) = 0. This gives us, once again,
s(Γ) = s(T (A)) + s(T (B)) = s(A) + s(B), (28)
and s is constant under T .
Now if S is an integrable function on Γ, for some measure µ, take
s(A) =
∫
A
S dµ. (29)
Then the theorems show that, if S is almost everywhere non-decreasing, it is
almost everywhere constant along the trajectories.
C The Zermelo proof of recurrence without con-
tinuity or invertibility
We wish to prove the Theorem in section 5.3.1 without appeal to continuity
of the flow; we assume the weaker condition that the flow is measurable. (A
function F is measurable iff, for every measurable set X , F−1(X) = {x | F (x) ∈
X} is a measurable set.)
Consider as in section 5.2.2 any measurable set g and its entire future devel-
opment
G =
⋃
m≥0
Tmτ (g). (30)
associated with multiples of the given time period τ . Similarly consider the
entire future development of Tτ (g):
Gτ =
⋃
m≥1
Tmτ (g). (31)
First, we want to show that almost all points in g are in Gτ .
Lemma C1. TτG = Gτ .
Proof Take any x ∈ Tτ (G). Then there exists a y ∈ G such that x = Tτy,
which means that there exists a z ∈ g, and t ≥ 0, such that x = TτTtz.
By the semi-group property of the flow, TτTt = Tτ+t = TtTτ . So x ∈ Gτ .
Conversely, take any x ∈ Gτ . Then there exists a z ∈ g and t′ ≥ 0 such
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that x = TtTτz = TτTtz. Thus there exists a y ∈ G such that x = Tτy. So
x ∈ Tτ (G).117
Now since µ(Γ) is finite, G has finite measure. By construction, Gτ is con-
tained in G. But from the Lemma, and because the flow is measure-preserving,
we have µ(Gτ ) = µ(G). Therefore the set of elements of G that are not also in
Gτ is of measure zero. But since g is contained in G, all but a set of measure
zero of states in g are in Gτ , as desired.
This means that there are states in gτ that return to g, which in turn means
that there are states in g that return to g for some time t ≥ τ . Now let r be the
set of recurrent points in g. We want to show finally is that almost all states in
g recur, i.e. that µ(r) = µ(g).
Let r˜ be the set of points in g that are future destinations of points in g:
r˜ = g ∩Gτ =
⋃
m≥1
Tmτ (r). (32)
From above we know that µ(r˜) = µ(g).
Let us partition r into disjoint sets of points that recur at the same time.
Let sm be the set of points in r whose first recurrence occurs at mτ . (Note
that Tmτ (sm) ∈ r is measurable, so it follows from the assumption that Tt is
measurable that sm is measurable.) Then sm ∩ sn = ∅ for distinct m, n, and
r =
⋃
m≥1
sm. (33)
Moreover, since for every point in r˜ there is a time of first recurrence,
r˜ =
⋃
m≥1
Tmτ (sm). (34)
Since each sm is measurable, it follows that
µ(r) =
∞∑
m=1
µ(sm). (35)
But by the measure-preserving nature of the flow, for each m
µ(Tmτ (sm)) = µ(sm). (36)
This gives us from (30)
µ(r˜) ≤
∞∑
m=1
µ(Tmτ (sm)) =
∞∑
m=1
µ(sm) = µ(r). (37)
Since µ(r˜) = µ(g), this gives us µ(g) ≤ µ(r). And since r ⊆ g, it follows finally
that µ(r) = µ(g).
117Here is how Zermelo (1896) put the argument.“When the region g changes with time, at
the same time all its ‘later phases’ will change into the following ones, and G also changes so
that it represents at any instant the ’future’ of the corresponding of the corresponding phase
[Tt(g)].”
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D Proof of the weak non-intersection lemma with-
out invertibility
Recall that the lemma in section 5.3.1 asserts that the sequence of time devel-
opments Tnτ (g¯) of the non-recurring set g¯ is such that for every n,m ≥ 0 and
n 6= m, Tnτ (g¯) ∩ Tmτ (g¯) = ∅. Here we wish to prove a weaker result without
appeal to invertibility of the flow, namely that µ (Tnτ (g¯) ∩ Tmτ (g¯)) = 0. First
we prove a second lemma.
Lemma D1. If T is a measure-preserving map from the phase space to
itself, then for any measurable sets X , Y ,
µ(T (X) ∩ T (Y )) = µ(X ∩ Y ). (38)
Proof We make use of the fact that
T (X) ∪ T (Y ) = T (X ∪ Y ). (39)
If T is measure-preserving,
µ(T (X ∪ Y )) = µ(X ∪ Y ) = µ(X) + µ(Y )− µ(X ∩ Y ). (40)
Also,
µ(T (X) ∪ T (Y )) = µ(T (X)) + µ(T (Y ))− µ(T (X) ∩ T (Y )) (41)
= µ(X) + µ(Y )− µ(T (X) ∩ T (Y )). (42)
Comparing XX and XX gives us
µ(T (X) ∩ T (Y )) = µ(X ∩ Y ). (43)
We apply this lemma now to the Poincare´ theorem by taking T = Tnτ . For
all k, n ≥ 0,
µ
(
Tnτ (g¯) ∩ T(n+k)τ (g¯)
)
= µ (Tnτ (g¯) ∩ Tnτ (Tkτ (g¯))) = µ (g¯ ∩ Tkτ (g¯)) . (44)
Since g¯ ∩ Tkτ (g¯) = ∅ for all k > 0, we have the result that
µ
(
Tnτ (g¯) ∩ T(n+k)τ (g¯)
)
= 0 (45)
for all n ≥ 0, k > 0.
E The Collision Assumption is not time-symmetric
The Collision Assumption defined in section 3 above for the wind-tree model
is time-asymmetric in the sense that it is defined for pre-collision, not post-
collision velocities. In this Appendix, we show furthermore that if it holds at
time t0 for forward velocities, and at t0 + ∆t for the reversed velocities, then
the distribution at both t0 and t0 +∆t must be the equilibrium distribution.
We can rewrite equation (19) above in the compact form
f(t0 +∆t) = (I − k∆tC)f(t0), (46)
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where f = (f1, . . . , f4) and
C =


2 −1 0 −1
−1 2 −1 0
0 −1 2 −1
−1 0 −1 2

 . (47)
Now we can implement the time reversal operation in equation (8) at any
time by the matrix equation f ′(t) = P f(t), where the permutation P is given by
P =


0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0

 . (48)
It is easy to check that, as expected, P 2 = I, and furthermore that P commutes
with C.
Now if the Collision Assumption holds for the reversed velocities at t0+∆t,
then
P f(t0) = (I − k∆tC)P f(t0 +∆t). (49)
But acting on (46) by P , we get
P f(t0 +∆t) = P (I − k∆tC)f(t0) (50)
= (I − k∆tC)P f(t0). (51)
And substituting P f(t0) from (49) we obtain
P f(t0 +∆t) = (I − k∆tC)2P f(t0 +∆t). (52)
And this is only possible for arbitrary small ∆t if f(t0 +∆t), and hence f(t0),
are the equilibrium distribution (see equation (7)) f¯ = 14I.
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